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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On appeal, Mr. Parton asserted that the following errors were present in his case: 
(1) the district court erred when it overruled his objections to the opinion testimony of 
Detective Matthew Brechwald regarding jail telephone calls; (2) the district court abused 
its discretion when it admitted, as an excited utterance, a statement made by the victim 
after she had fallen asleep; (3) even if the two errors complained of above are 
individually harmless, the cumulative error doctrine requires reversal; (4) the evidence 
was insufficient to support the jury's finding that he was a persistent violator; and (5) the 
prosecutor violated Mr. Parton's Fifth Amendment rights when she improperly solicited 
testimony as to his pre-arrest silence, his post-arrest invocation of his right to counsel, 
and commented on his silence in her closing argument. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State asserts that none of the complained of errors 
occurred, and, in the alternative, that if any errors did occur they were harmless. (See 
generally Respondent's Brief.) The State's arguments in response to two issues are 
relevant to this Reply Brief. First, the State argues that the district court did not err in 
admitting Detective Brechwald's testimony because he was an expert witness despite 
the State affirmatively stating that he was not being offered as an expert witness, that 
other claims concerning his testimony were not preserved by objection, and that, even if 
it was error to admit his testimony, any such error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-15.) Second, the State argues that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury's persistent violator finding. (Respondent's Brief, pp.20-
23.) 
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This Reply Brief is necessary in order to respond to the State's arguments 
concerning the admission of Detective Brechwald's testimony over Mr. Parton's 
objection and the persistent violator enhancement. While Mr. Parton maintains that the 
other asserted errors occurred and should be remedied, he will rely upon the arguments 
set forth in his Appellant's Brief as to those errors and will not reiterate them herein. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Parton's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
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ISSUES 
1. Was Detective Brechwald's testimony properly admitted? 
2. Must the State's argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
the persistent violator finding be rejected under State v. Zichko because it failed 
to cite to authority in support of its argument? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Detective Brechwald's Testimony Was Not Properly Admitted 
In opposing Mr. Parton's claims that the district court erred when it overruled his 
objection to the testimony of Detective Brechwald the State advances two primary 
arguments: (1) that two of the bases upon which Mr. Parton claims error were not 
preserved by objection; and (2) that this Court can affirm, on an alternate ground that 
was expressly disavowed by the State at trial, as to the basis it acknowledges was 
preserved by objection. 1 For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Parton asserts that the 
State's arguments are without merit. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-15.) 
With respect to the claim that it acknowledges was preserved by objection below, 
the State argues, 
Parton acknowledges he objected to Detective Brechwald's testimony on 
the ground that it "call[ed] for opinion testimony of an expert when it would 
not assist the trier of fact," but he does not address whether the testimony 
was admissible under I.R.E. 702, presumably in light of the prosecutor's 
position below that she was not offering it as expert testimony. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-14.) While the prosecutor affirmatively asserted 
she was "not offering [Detective Brechwald] as an expert under 702" (Trial 
Tr., Vol. I, p.315, Ls.16-17), the state's questioning was based on 
Detective Brechwald's specific expertise and it is readily apparent that the 
court viewed Detective Brechwald as an expert even if it is not entirely 
clear that the court admitted the testimony on this basis (see Trial Tr., 
VoLl, p.314, Ls.2-3, 13-14). Regardless, this Court can affirm on any 
basis supported by the record. Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada 
County Highway Dist., 148 Idaho 688, 696, 227 P.3d 942, 950 (Ct. App. 
2010) ("an appellate court may affirm the district court's decision if an 
alternative legal basis supports it") (citations omitted). Application of the 
correct legal standard to the facts supports the conclusion that Detective 
1 The State also argues that, even if Detective Brechwald's testimony was erroneously 
admitted, any such error was harmless. With respect to that argument, Mr. Parton 
relies upon the argument set forth in his Appellant's Brief (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-15), 
and will not reiterate it herein. 
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Brechwald could provide expert testimony explaining the interplay 
between the dynamics of domestic violence and the statements Parton 
made to Theresa following his arrest. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14 (brackets in original).) 
The State's argument is untenable and un persuasive for a number of reasons. 
First, the State affirmatively abandoned the argument that Detective Brechwald was an 
expert witness at trial, a fact that the State, on appeal, candidly acknowledges, and, as 
such, the State should be judicially estopped from making a contrary argument on 
appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine of judicial estoppel for 
nearly sixty years. Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235 (2008) (noting that it first 
recognized the doctrine in Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87 (1954)). "Judicial estoppel 
'precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a 
second advantage by taking an incompatible position.'" Id. (quoting McKay v. Owens, 
130 Idaho 148, 152 (1997)). It is "intended to prevent abuse of the judicial process by 
deliberate shifting of positions to suit the exigencies of a particular action." Id. (citing 
McKay, 130 Idaho at 153). 
Before the district court, the State was confronted with an argument by defense 
counsel that the jury did not need to hear expert testimony from Detective Brechwald 
regarding his impressions of the phone calls between Mr. Parton and the alleged victim. 
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.315, Ls.5-15.) Rather than seeking a ruling from the district court as 
to whether the witness was qualified as an expert and, if so, whether the witness could 
offer such testimony, the State expressly disavowed any argument that Detective 
Brechwald was an expert, preventing the district court from ruling on whether he was an 
expert and to what extent he could testify as such. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.315, Ls.16-23.) As 
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a result, the State prevailed before the district court on a theory that Detective 
Brechwald was not testifying as an expert. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.315, L.24 - p.316, L.24.) 
It appears that the State's deliberate decision to disclaim any reliance on 
Detective Brechwald as an expert was based on a pre-trial conference at which the 
State, defense counsel, and the district court engaged in the following discussion 
regarding the potential use of Detective Brechwald as an expert witness: 
[The State]: Your Honor, there's one brief issue. I don't know. 
just wanted to make court and counsel aware that regarding the state's 
expert witness we disclosed according to Rule 16(k), both Detective 
Breckweld [sic] and provided the CD, as well as Ladessa Foster. She 
works for the WCA. 
The one issue I see perhaps in using Detective 
Breckwald [sic] is that he did listen to one jail call associated with this 
case. He wasn't involved in any other way regarding the investigation. 
However, he did listen to a jail call. I don't know if Your Honor or defense 
counsel thought that that would prohibit him from being the state's expert. 
THE COURT: What is he going to be an expert on? 
[The State]: Domestic violence dynamics. 
THE COURT: Is he going to testify as to the phone call, or what? 
[The State]: Well, if I used him as the state's domestic violence 
expert, I would not have him testify to the phone call at all. The jury 
wouldn't know that he had ever listened to anything regarding this case, 
but I did want to have an honest disclosure regarding that to see if Your 
Honor believed that that would prohibit him as being the state's chosen 
expert. 
THE COURT: I don't think it prohibits, but Mr. Smith could certainly 
cross-examine him on that if you think that it somehow affected his 
opinion. 
[Defense Counsel]: Right. 
Thank you. 
[The State]: Okay. I guess I just wanted to make everyone aware. 
Thank you, Judge. 
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THE COURT: 
violence? 
And then you have another expert on domestic 
[The State]: Well, no. The state would only use one or the other. 
It would be my preference due to scheduling at this time to use Detective 
Breckwald [sic], because Ms. Foster - so it would be my strong preference 
to use Detective Breckwald [sic] because of scheduling, but I didn't know if 
that issue, the fact that he had listened to one jail call, would prohibit him 
from serving in that capacity, especially given the pretrial argument we 
had on this issue regarding the state's use of [a] domestic violence expert. 
THE COURT: Right. He's not going to give an opinion that domestic 
violence actually occurred; he's just telling the jury about the dynamics of 
domestic violence. 
(Pretrial Conference Tr., p.2, L.9 - pA, L.11 (emphases added).) 
The State's reference to the pretrial argument concerning the use of a domestic 
violence expert witness was to the following colloquy between the district court and the 
State concerning defense counsel's objection to the use of a domestic violence expert: 
[The State]: And, again, I think it's - you know, Mr. Smith's 
argument that he hasn't - either expert, Ms. Foster or Detective 
Brechweld [sic] has spoken to this particular victim and counseled her for 
anything, I think that goes to the reason why an expert is appropriate in 
this case; otherwise it would be unfairly and improperly having somebody 
come in and comment on the specific victim of this case['s] credibility, and 
that's not what this is about. 
I mean, in State v. Dutt,e] an Idaho case from the 
Court of Appeals in 2003, an expert in that case - it was a child abuse 
case - but it was allowed in order to "provide the jurors with specialized 
knowledge that could assist them in evaluating the victim's credibility" 
without specifically commenting on the victim of this particular crime. 
THE COURT: Yes. And in that case, it dealt with the expert's opinion 
regarding general behavior and emotional characteristics of the victim and 
offender in child sexual abuse cases, so it wasn't specific to the actual 
victim and offender in that case. 
2 See State v. Duff, 139 Idaho 99 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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And it appears that the victim would go to general 
issues, as to behavior, emotional considerations, the things that the state's 
wanting to use the expert for, so the court would allow that, but, of course, 
again, I'd still be listening to the case and determining whether or not it 
continued to be relevant, depending on the case, how the facts come out 
So I think the authority is outlined in State v. Dutt, that 
allow the state to do this, and it does appear that it would help the jurors to 
understand the dynamics of domestic violence. 
Okay, and the, of course, when the expert testifies, I 
mean they're talking about victims then generally, not the specific victim in 
this case. 
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.12, L.18 - p.15, L.18 (emphasis added).) 
The State's citation to Dutt, which was the basis for the district court's order 
allowing expert testimony about the dynamics of domestic violence in general, is 
important to understand why the State did not attempt to have Detective Brechwald 
qualified as an expert before he testified about the telephone calls. In Dutt, the Court of 
Appeals held that it was appropriate for an expert on child sexual abuse to testify 
concerning "the general progression of child sexual abuse through various phases, as 
well as the behavior and characteristics of the victim and offender during the 
progression," finding it to be appropriate precisely because the expert "did not link the 
general progression of child sexual abuse to the particular circumstances of the 
offenses with which Dutt was charged, and she offered no opinion specifically 
addressing the experiences or credibility" of the specific victim in the underlying case. 
Dutt, 139 Idaho at 104. 
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Unlike the facts in Duff, in this case, Detective Brechwald specifically applied his 
knowledge and training to the telephone calls that he listened to before testifying over 
defense counsel's objection. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.317, Ls.5-20.) Based on the 
representations of the State below and the ruling of the district court, such testimony 
would not have been allowed had the State sought to qualify Detective Brechwald as an 
expert witness. Now, after prevailing precisely because it disavowed an argument that 
Detective Brechwald was an expert, the State seeks to prevail on appeal by adopting 
the very argument that it disavowed to obtain a favorable ruling below. This tactic 
provides a textbook case for applying judicial estoppel. 
Next, even if the State was not judicially estopped from making a contradictory 
argument on appeal regarding Detective Brechwald's status as an expert witness, Duff 
and the argument set forth by the State, which was adopted by the district court, during 
the pretrial discussion of expert witnesses make it clear that Detective Brechwald could 
not have testified as an expert about domestic violence dynamics while applying any 
such expertise to the facts of this case. As such, the State's claim that "it is readily 
apparent that the court viewed Detective Brechwald as an expert even if it is not entirely 
clear that the court admitted the testimony on this basis" (Respondent's Brief, p.13), is 
not just unsupported by the record, it is wholly contradicted by it. 
The State's remaining argument is that Mr. Parton only objected on the grounds 
that Detective Brechwald's testimony constituted improper expert testimony, and did not 
preserve claims that the testimony was irrelevant and constituted an improper opinion 
by a lay witness. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-12.) With respect to the lay witness claim, 
Mr. Parton asserts that, from the context of the argument following his objection, it is 
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obvious that he objected on grounds that the testimony was improper lay witness 
testimony and irrelevant. 
After the State expressly disavowed any argument that Detective Brechwald was 
being offered as an expert witness, defense counsel said, "I'm not withdrawing the 
objection. You can rule as you choose, but I maintain the objection. But I think it is up 
to the jury to determine what these calls mean to them." (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.315, L.16 -
p.316, L.15.) Defense counsel's statement makes no sense if it was solely intended to 
continue objecting with respect to a position that the State had already expressly 
disavowed. It only makes sense in the context of the argument if the objection was to 
the testimony of Detective Brechwald in general, including its relevance and, in light of 
the State's abandonment of any attempt to qualify him as an expert, his position as a lay 
witness. 
As the State's arguments concerning Detective Brechwald's testimony are 
without merit, for the reasons set forth in his Appellant's Brief and in this Reply Brief, 
Mr. Parton respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction and 
remand this matter to the district court for a new trial. 
II. 
The State's Argument As To The Sufficiency Of The Evidence Supporting The 
Persistent Violator Finding Is Not Supported With Citation To Authority And Must Be 
Rejected Under State v. Zichko 
In opposing Mr. Parton's argument that the evidence presented was insufficient 
to support the jury's finding that he was a persistent violator, the State argues, 
Evidence that a felony judgment was previously entered against an 
individual with the exact same name and exact same birthday as Parton 
was sufficient for the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
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Parton was the same person formerly convicted pursuant to the judgment 
admitted as Exhibit 32. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.23.) The State cites no authority in support of its proposition that 
similarity in name and date of birth in a prior judgment of conviction is sufficient to 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the person named in that judgment is the 
same as the person alleged to be a persistent violator. (Respondent's Brief, pp.22-23.) 
As such, the State's argument must be rejected under State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 
263 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is 
lacking"). 
It is worth noting that the State does not discuss, let alone attempt to rebut, 
Mr. Parton's citation, in his Appellant's Brief, to State v. Lawyer, 150 Idaho 170 (Ct. App. 
2010), and his accompanying argument that something more than the same name and 
date of birth is needed in order to provide sufficient evidence to support a finding, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person named in a prior judgment of conviction is 
the same person charged in a later prosecution. 3 (Respondent's Brief, pp.20-23; 
Appellant's Brief, pp.21-22 (the Lawyer argument).) 
In light of the State's failure to provide authority in support of its argument 
concerning the sufficiency of the evidence as to the persistent violator enhancement, 
this Court should find the argument to be waived on appeal. As such, for the reasons 
set forth in his Appellant's Brief, this Court should vacate the persistent violator finding, 
3 The State quotes a portion of Mr. Parton's argument, namely, "A judgment of 
conviction bearing the same name as the defendant, with nothing more, is insufficient to 
establish the identity of the person formerly convicted beyond a reasonable doubt," and 
then proceeds to respond only to that incomplete version of Mr. Parton's argument. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.22-23 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).) 
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enter a judgment of acquittal on it, and remand this matter to the district court for 
resentencing without such an enhancement. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Parton 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand this 
matter to the district court for a new trial. Additionally, if this Court remands Mr. Parton's 
case for a new trial and finds that the evidence supporting the persistent violator 
enhancement is insufficient, he respectfully requests that this Court enter a judgment of 
acquittal on the enhancement. In the alternative, if this Court only finds error in the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the persistent violator finding, Mr. Parton 
respectfully requests that this Court enter a judgment of acquittal on the enhancement, 
and remand this matter to the district court for resentencing on the underlying charges. 
DATED this 13th day of March, 2012. 
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